EUROPEAN TRANSITIONAL STATES THROUGH THE PRYSM OF SECURITY SITUATION - PAST AND PRESENT

 

Andrej Miholič

 

             Security in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe has always been inseparably linked to that of Europe as a whole. From a security standpoint the territory of the present transitional states has played an important role as the crossroads between Europe and Asia throughout history. This paper focuses primarily on the change of perception of threat in the region from the beginning of the 20th century until today. A special emphasis is put on the topical threats, faced by transitional states in recent years. The entire period discussed in the paper can be roughly divided into four parts, characterised by the most significant events both for the European continent and the rest of the world - World War I, World War II and the collapse of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and its European allies at the beginning of the 1990s.

 

1. Lost in the whirl of the empires' interests (1900-1918)

 

            The events in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe from the beginning of the 20th century to the end of World War I have been subject to the interests of four great powers- Austria-Hungary, Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Germany. Only four of the present European transitional states existed then: Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Romania, but their independence was only a formality, since their policies were greatly influenced by Russia.

The main security threat was the danger of conflict among the regional super-powers. Practically, the nations could not influence the great powers' decisions at all as their members were in fact second-class citizens in their own countries. Nationally mixed armed forces were maintained to cope with any threats. The most important strategic demand and advantage was the capability of rapid mobilisation of forces to the vicinity of the national borders to halt the advance of enemy forces.

The unbalanced colonial division of the world together with the increasing needs of fast developing European countries, led to the all-European conflict at the end of that period. The human and material capacities involved on all sides by far surpassed all previous armed conflicts. World War I drastically changed the political picture of the entire continent and especially the regions under discussion.

 

2. Dreams come true (1918-1945)

 

            Throughout the second half of the 19th century and in the first two decades of the 20th century, the national aspirations of the subjugated nations in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe were strengthened and finally realised at the end of World War I. Before the war, most of these countries - except Romania, Serbia and Montenegro - had been governed by Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia. The decision to grant these nations their sovereignty (The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, and Czechoslovakia) was mainly the result of the wish to destroy Austria-Hungary or restrict Germany and communist Russia the regional super-powers. Consequently, many countries emerged in that part of Europe in a relatively short period of time, but the relations between them were clouded by the territorial disputes, the result of hastily defined borders after World War I.

The main security threats facing the states in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe were the danger of expansion of the communist revolution beyond the Russian borders and the possibility of a military intervention by neighbouring countries or potential alliances. The states' interior security was based on powerful police forces and security services, while defence from outside threats depended on large national armed forces using conscripts. With the emergence and consolidation of totalitarian regimes with communist, Nazi and fascist ideologies, favourable conditions existed once again for the outbreak of a far-reaching military conflict which expanded into other parts of the world. The Eastern and South-Eastern European countries were divided between the opposing sides. The occupation by the Axis forces was followed by military rebellions in many of these states, and a civil war in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

3. The conflict of ideologies (1945-1991)

 

            The anti-Nazi alliance was marred before the end of World War II. Western democracies felt increasingly threatened by the rapid increase in Soviet military power and its expansionistic policy, based on the principle of spreading communist ideology deep into the heart of the Europe. Soon after the war, the continent was sharply divided by a line of separation which drastically influenced the topical political picture. On the one side, there were multiparty systems with market economies and on the other, one-party communist systems with planned economies. The states that we nowadays call transitional were formally independent, although under strong Soviet influence - with the exception of Tito's Yugoslavia and later Hoxha's Albania. In these countries communist ideology replaced nationalism which was then “frozen” together with the ethnic disputes generating from it.

            The European communist regimes found it essential to reinforce their authority which required with drastic measures against any form of domestic opposition. Consequently, extremely powerful security services and police forces tried to ensure the uniform behaviour of their citizens by imposing fear throughout society. Similar measures were used in externally, but within the eastern-bloc - military force used in Yugoslavia in 1948, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The main security threat to the West was the possibility of an all-out conventional war between the blocs in Europe; the final phase being an all-out nuclear exchange resulting in severe mutual losses and grievous setbacks in development. Such a threat required large military forces which in continental Europe were based on the conscript system, whereas, the USA and Great Britain had professional armies. In the case of an armed conflict military forces of the East-European states would initially serve as a buffer zone for the Soviet forces, especially if tactical nuclear armament was used, or as support forces to the Soviet units on the offensive. Hence, the defence of an individual state in the Warsaw Pact was subordinated to the defence of the alliance. At that time, Yugoslavia was the only exception and led the policy of a more or less successful steering between the interests of both blocs.

 

4. Fragmentation vs. integration (1991-present)

 

            The Cold War ended in 1991 with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and final collapse of Europe’s communist regimes, which fell like dominoes. After more or less democratic elections, the new governments trod the thorny path of transition with varied success. In this part of Europe and especially in the southern region, two contrasting trends have been identified in the last decade and a half. On one hand, the transitional states try to catch up economically as soon as possible with the West. They consider the most efficient method to achieve stability and progress, is integration into the European Union and NATO (as its defence and security upgrade). On the other hand, there has been a process of fragmentation in the territories of the former multinational states. This can still be seen in Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia and Moldova.

 

4.1. The outbreak of nationalism

 

At the collapse of the Soviet bloc a vacuum emerged in numerous states following the disintegration of communist ideology. It was replaced with re-awakened nationalist tendencies that led to the destruction of multinational states in the region. In Czechoslovakia this process was carried out peacefully, whereas violence broke out in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In the European part of the former Soviet Union there was an armed conflict in Moldova. However, the Asian part has been and still is full of conflict areas - Georgia (Abkhazia, Adjaria and South Ossetia), Chechnya, Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh) and Tajikistan. In the former Yugoslavia the situation was even worse. Following the Albanian rebellion in 2001, FYR Macedonia was the last to face the turmoil of ethnic tensions resulting from the turbulent past and being "frozen" during the communist regime. The turmoil started in Slovenia at the end of June 1991, then Croatia (1991-1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) and Kosovo and Serbia and Montenegro (1999).

Even today the reasons for many of these conflicts have not been satisfactorily solved (Bosnia and Herzegovina remains un-united and un-stable, the problem of returning Serbian refugees to Croatia, the unsettled status of Kosovo and occasional religious tensions in Sanjak, etc.), so the possibility of renewed violence in this region remains a latent threat for the future. The same is true of Moldova where the status of the separatist Transnistria region has not yet been solved.

Besides those afore mentioned issues, the status of individual minorities in East European states represents a potential focus of ethnic tensions. One example is the disputable Hungarian legislation which granted special social and cultural rights to Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries (Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro) some of which objected to such measures. Another example is the status of the large Russian minority in the Baltic States, especially in Latvia and Estonia where the Russian minority makes up nearly a third of the population. However, it is necessary to stress that the involved states have been solving those issues  peacefully, using political dialogue, and show every intention to do so in the future.

 

4.2. Diversification of threats

 

            Ethnic disputes are not the only source of security threats that the transitional states have been coping with. In connection with globalisation trends, the poor economic situation and political instability of these states after the collapse of the communist regimes helped to create ideal conditions for the expansion of the so-called "post-modern" threats. Such threats include organized crime, the danger of economic collapse. This has been demonstrated by the events in Albania in 1997 when the collapse of the ‘Pyramid’ investment schemes resulted in extensive riots and total disintegration of the governing structures, so that the international community had to intervene, illegal migrations (especially economically motivated refugees from the third-world countries), ecological problems (mainly the occasional reproaches of certain western countries about the presumable poor safety of individual East-European nuclear power plants, for example Temelin nuclear plant in the Czech Republic) and last but not least, local and international terrorism.[1]

            A widespread social disapproval due to their role in the past, as well as economic and political instability which resulted from the change of regime at the beginning of the 1990s also influenced the drastic reduction of the power and capacities of the once respected and feared security forces in these states. Moreover, the deficiencies in legislation caused widespread organised crime in the region. In particular, the drug trade from Central Asia into the West (the most active in Europe are the Albanian gangs); trading in weapons from the enormous stockpiles from the Cold War era and where there were armed conflicts in the last fifteen years; trading in people, especially selling of women from Eastern Europe and Asia for prostitution. Such activities are enormously profitable to the criminal organisations in East and South East Europe. Therefore, they have relatively significant influence on government policy in some states, sometimes even at the highest level.

            The transitional states' capabilities to cope with such security threats are more or less limited, so they urgently need assistance from abroad. Thus, the role of the West with its international structures is extremely important. Intensive international co-operation both at bilateral and multilateral levels is needed to minimise "post-modern" threats (all the above mentioned threats have a significant international character). The transitional states can achieve this only through the establishment of stable and democratic government structures, the rule of law, functioning free markets and human rights enshrined in the constitution and in practice.

 

4.3. Terrorism as a global threat

 

            Terrorism is certainly one of the most topical post-modern security threats, therefore it is presented separately in this paper. This threat has been present on the European continent for well over a century. The most significant terrorists from the first half of the 20th century were the Russian anarchists and their targets and methods were rather typical for the period until the end of World War II. Most of the attacks were aimed at selectively chosen targets (more or less exposed political representatives) and, as a rule, the terrorist groups did not operate outside an individual state. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Austrian Crown Prince, met with the widest response in that time and provided the great European powers with a reason to start World War I.

            The next stage of terrorism can be limited to the period from the end of World War II to the beginning of the 1990s. During that period in particular, large ethnically motivated groups with enormous logistic support, including the PIRA in Northern Ireland, some Palestinian groups, Basque ETA, etc., and some smaller ideologically motivated groups prevailed. Namely the latter were radical left-wing groups which were active in Europe (Italian Brigate Rosse, French Action Direct, German RAF, etc.), South America (Colombian FARC, Peruvian Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, etc.) and in Asia (Japanese Red Army). At the end of that period the Middle East and North Africa saw the rise of a large number of extreme Islamic groups, among them the Lebanese Hezbollah and Egyptian al-Jihad and al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya. Initially these groups operated in the territory of an individual state but later they started to co-operate, especially within the framework of pan-Islamic mobilization to fight against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and defined their goals internationally.

   Regarding logistical support for terrorists, state support played an important role. A wide range of states were culpable, from both super-powers and their allies to individual states which, by supporting such activities, saw a good opportunity to achieve their foreign policy goals - for example: Iran, Libya and Syria.  Some transitional states also supported terrorism, especially the European left-wing groups by providing assistance with finance, weapons and safe havens.

The end of the Cold War resulted in a significant decrease in state support of terrorism.[2] This trend reached its peak after the events on September 11, 2001 when the last states sponsoring terrorism stopped or at least limited their activities - e.g.: Iran which feared military intervention by the USA. Considering the fight against terrorism, however, the trend in decreased state support did not have significantly positive consequences in the long run. Numerous terrorist groups efficiently adapted to the loss of that source of finance, safe havens, training, weapons and other equipment by a re-direction to the other sources. Thus, they evaded the state control over their activities and became completely autonomous. This is also one of the reasons for increased attacks on the unselectively chosen targets. In recent years, there has been a higher level of damage caused by terrorist attacks considering both human and material loss. The other reason is better protection of obvious targets, the search for greater media attention, the increased number of terrorist groups with apocalyptic and genocidal goals (cults and other extreme religious groups, various right-wing groups, etc.) and easier access to sophisticated weapons.

The process of economic globalisation, accessibility to weapons and technological progress in the field of transport and communications also enable relatively small groups with more or less moderate resources to conduct continuous terrorist campaigns in a geographically large area. In past decades the terrorist groups have increasingly become active internationally. Their main motives for this are:

·        Logistical needs – recruitment of new members, their training, acquisition of financial assets, weapons, etc.;

·        Reduced risks /enabling continuous activities (if the group is destroyed by security forces in one country, it retains active cells elsewhere which continue operations;

·        International objectives: the fight against an individual state (regime) can quickly be upgraded into the fight against all members of the alliance which supports its interests; international goals are still characteristic mainly for the ideologically and religiously motivated groups;

·        Operational opportunities: each state has a large number of diplomatic, economic, cultural and other representatives abroad; by spreading their operational activities into foreign states, there is a wide range of new potential targets for an individual terrorist group; due to the inadequate perception of security threats or inefficiency of local security forces these targets are sometimes poorly protected;

·        Promotion of goals: if, due to the censorship in their own country, publicising the goals of individual groups is prohibited, therefore the groups then promote them abroad – this is the case with neo-Nazi groups in Germany and extreme Islamic groups in Egypt;

 

The terrorist groups carrying out the attacks in a geographically dispersed area need a relatively broad logistical support. Due to the limited resources in an individual area, faster accessibility and/or reduced risks they disperse it in various geographically separated locations (usually in various countries).

            In the last development stage of this phenomenon which began in the first half of the 1990s and still continues, terrorism has reached financial self-sufficiency and, consequently, also a full political and operational autonomy. The two consequences of such a process of "privatization" from the state control characteristic of the previous period, are the increased unpredictability of terrorist groups' activities and also the increased scope of destruction caused by the terrorist attacks in recent years (there are no more external factors to limit the choice of targets and means used). This trend that was also acknowledged by the Director of the CIA, John Deutsch,[3] is clearly visible from the figures 1-6 (see appendix) showing a gradual increase in the number of victims of terrorist incidents since the end of World War II. The processes of "privatization" and internationalization of terrorist groups are therefore the main features which characterize the development of this phenomenon in the past decade.

 

 

 

4.3.1. Terrorism and transitional states

 

            The terrorist groups' activities can be roughly divided into operational - direct preparations and performing the attacks - and support - all forms of logistical activities which enable these groups undisturbed performance of operational activities. Considering the possibility that contemporary terrorist groups would carry out either of the two activities mentioned above on their territory, the threats to the European transitional states can be divided into direct and indirect. The former means an actual physical threat to the citizens of an individual state and their property, while the latter means above all the political consequences which that state would have to cope with if it served as a kind of "logistic basis" to the terrorist groups for their operational activities in Western Europe or North America. Even if it was "only" the incompetence of security forces and other supervision services and not an intentional decision of the authorities, the future of the process of integration of such a state into the Euro-Atlantic partnerships (which most transitional states consider as the key process for their further political and economic development) would be essentially threatened, at least for a short period of time.

            Although direct terrorist groups' threats to transitional states seem significantly less likely than the second form of threats, there are certain risks present in the region which  could in future lead to the realization of such threats. Some of the most probable potential targets and motives include the following:

·        The representatives and/or the infrastructure of authority or the members of ethnic and religious groups due to the radicalization of ethnic and/or religious tensions between the majority population and various marginalized groups in an individual state. In the discussed part of Europe particularly the cases of Serbia and Montenegro (the unsettled status of Kosovo and the tensions between the Albanian majority and Serbian minority in the province; the large Muslim community in Sanjak which has already suffered from the excesses of the Orthodox majority in the recent past; also the members of the Croatian and Hungarian minorities in Vojvodina are occasionally a target of the nationalists' threats), Bosnia and Herzegovina (despite nearly a decade of peace the relations among the entities could still considerably aggravate), FYR Macedonia (the tensions between the Macedonian majority and Albanian minority), and Moldova (the unsettled status of Transnistria region) stand out;

·        The representatives and/or the infrastructure of authority or an unselectively chosen group of citizens due to the terrorist groups' wish to influence the policy of a target state. The motive for the selection of such targets could be the participation of individual transitional states' armed forces in military operations in Iraq and/or Afghanistan (most of these states participate with their armed forces in one or the other operation). The topical example showing the possibility of such a threat was the terrorist attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004 which essentially influenced the  parliamentary election results in Spain and consequently that country’s withdrawal from the Iraq;

·        The political representatives and/or members of armed forces and/or infrastructure of individual states in conflict areas. Attacks on such targets would  probably be only part of a wider campaign intended to achieve the withdrawal of foreign forces (at present the transitional states with their political representatives and armed forces in Iraq and/or Afghanistan have to cope with such risks);

·        The members and/or infrastructure of international peacekeeping forces in the transitional states, where post-conflict stabilization operations take place, could become targets due to the supposed bias towards the opposing sides or disagreement with the policy of their countries (members of units participating in operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo under NATO and UN command);

·        The representatives and/or infrastructure of other states (embassies, attachés, etc.) and trans-national partnerships (e.g. European Union, NATO and UN) which could become targets due to disagreement with their policy[4]. Poor security due to insufficient understanding of a threat in a particular state and/or inefficiency of local security forces; these representatives could also be targeted by terrorist groups which are otherwise not active in the region.

 

Despite the above mentioned risks it should be emphasized that they are only theoretical, and that the countries under discussion are regarded as "low-profile" members of the international community. Therefore, activities will not have much impact internationally. Thus, it is more probable that the internationally oriented terrorist groups will direct their operational activities towards targets in those countries more closely involved.

 

            Although a possible terrorist attack on a transitional state or on their overseas representative is relatively low, there is a stronger possibility of indirect threats from terrorist groups. Political instability, economic under-development (and consequential lack of financial supervision), corruptibility of civil servants, spread of crime and poor border control are some examples which in certain transitional countries or in certain areas of their territories, provide ideal conditions for terrorist groups to operate and to support their activities in the West or in other parts of the world.

Recently, individual states in the region have been exposed to logistic activities of certain international Islamic terrorist groups, which came to the region during recent armed conflicts, in which some Muslims (in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) have been involved. These terrorist groups supported the Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians with experienced soldiers (mainly the so-called “Afghan Arabs”) who also served as instructors for new recruits, with weapons and financial resources (mostly donated by the Arab countries). At the same time they have tried to set up bases for their operations against their own Arab governments and/or the West.[5]

Individual parts of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are susceptible especially in the field of organizational activities, financing and acquisition of weapons.

 

 

 

1.   ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES:

·        Recruitment of new members, especially among members of ethnic and religious groups in the region that are, or have been, subjected to violence, economic sanctions or other forms of pressure due to political and/or religious reasons (The Albanian population in Kosovo, southern Serbia and FYR Macedonia, the Muslim population of Bosnia- Herzegovina and Sanjak, etc.);

·        Training of members - to meet this need terrorist groups could set up their bases in some areas where the central (state) authorities cannot or will not exercise their power to a satisfactory extent (for example parts of FYR Macedonia and Albania). These areas can also provide safe havens for those who prepare such attacks or try to evade the security forces after an attack has been carried out;

·        Transport of members into Western Europe via this region is made easier by poor border control in certain countries, corruptibility of the members of security forces and an extensive system of illegal paths to smuggle political and economic refugees from the third world into the West.

 

2.  FINANCING:

·        Collecting financial contributions (voluntary or involuntary in the form of the so-called "revolutionary taxes") from members of an ethnic or religious group which the terrorist group supposedly fights for, or from the wealthy sympathizers in the region (this is one means of finance used by the Albanian groups OVK in Kosovo and ANA in FYR Macedonia);

·        Fund raising through co-operation with organized crime, the most important is trading in drugs, arms and people. The most profitable is the drug trade involving mainly Albanian criminal groups gangs who are linked with the two above-mentioned Albanian groups[6];

·        Money laundering through the financial systems of these countries do not exercise a satisfactory level of control. This problem has often been exposed by numerous western countries and international organisations. According to the American CIA's estimates, published in The World Factbook 2004, a great majority of the European transitional states are still susceptible to the money laundering activities in spite of the gradual improvement in legislation and efficiency of financial control services.

 

3. ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS:

·        Purchase of arms and equipment in the illegal arms market. The vast stockpiles of weapons and equipment in the region are to a great extent the remnants of the arms race from the Cold War period, as well as the consequence of the conflicts in the last decade and a half (a special problem is a vast quantity of more or less sophisticated unregistered in civilian hands). Nowadays, the terrorist groups would mainly be buyers and not sellers in this market;

·        The purchase of so-called "dual-use" materials that can be used both for peaceful and military purposes. The control of this trade (for example ammonium nitrate which can be used as fertilizer or as a component for assembly of explosive devices) is rather inefficient in certain European transitional states, and could be taken advantage of by terrorist groups.

 

With the increasing importance of the international fight against terrorism the external pressures on the European transition countries to improve their role in this fight are also intensify. They should do more especially in preventing terrorist groups' logistical activities, but demands for their efficient performance often exceed their actual capabilities. Therefore it is essential to increase co-operation among transitional and other states affected by such threats regionally as well as internationally.

 

5. How to deal with security threats in the future?

 

      Today the transition countries face a wide range of threats. Included are those that are characteristic of previous periods (all-out conventional war following an invasion of a neighbouring country or alliance), latent internal ethnic conflicts (if such problems are ignored or inadequately treated, ethnic disputes in the region could again escalate into armed conflicts) and other post-modern threats. The latter include organized crime, economic crises, illegal migrations, ecological catastrophes and of course international and local terrorism. The situation regarding the activities to abolish or reduce such threats is so far rather poor at many levels, including state policies, legislation, competencies and capacities of state armed and security forces, as well as international co-operation. Despite significant improvements recently, important delays compared to the West still exist. For a successful improvement of the current security situation in the region it is necessary to meet the following:

·        To stabilize conditions in those transitional states which further political and economic development is prevented by ethnic tensions resulting from the armed conflicts in the last decade. Despite yearlong peacekeeping and peace-building operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, demanding significant military and police forces, as well as ample financial resources from abroad, the nationalist passions have still not completely calmed down yet. The main reason for that is excessive investment in measures to prevent violence at the expense of promoting democratic political dialogue and economic development. Ethnic tensions from the past conflicts also exist in FYR Macedonia and Moldova.

·        To strengthen national economies by stimulating efficient transition to market economies that will result in economic stability and international competitiveness. Therefore, they could cope more easily with the remaining threats.

·        To enhance the level of dialogue and mutual economic dependency within the region at bilateral and international levels, and thereby intensifying efforts to strengthen mutual trust. This has been pursued for more than three decades under OSCE auspices.

·        To establish a regional early-warning centre to identify general and specific security challenges threatening the European transitional states, and to monitor trends. It would be vital to avoid unnecessary duplication of activities of this and other existing systems at various levels of international co-operation;

·        To increase efficiency in the security forces and the legal framework of transitional states in their fight against organized crime. Besides improving legislation, competencies and quality of staff training, there must be co-operation with neighbouring countries to work together. Exchange of data on suspects of crime at the multilateral level, especially the co-operation within Interpol, and with Europol and Eurojust for the transitional states.

·        To improve the readiness of security forces and rescue services to react to a potential terrorist attack, to increase efficiency of security forces and financial control services to prevent logistic activities of terrorist groups often closely connected with organized crime. Therefore, it is useful that both phenomena fall under the same jurisdiction. As mentioned above, International co-operation at bilateral and multilateral levels is essential and the OSCE also has an extremely significant role, allying the Europe, North America and Central Asia in the fight against terrorism;

·        To stimulate projects to enhance awareness of ecological problems and to form a more suitable state policy in this area (for example, seeking more environment-friendly sources of energy to replace some aging nuclear power plants in transitional states that could be a serious threat.

This list does not cover all measures needed for an efficient and all-embracing fight against the many security risks facing transitional states today. However, it provides general guidelines which, could improve the security situation in the region and is also directly linked to its economic development. The transitional states' capacities at the national level are in most cases too poor to achieve satisfactory results. Therefore, it is essential to continue and increase co-operation between these states. The greatest difficulty in the area of security is the possibility of the region being divided according to the level of development taken place by gradual accession of smaller groups of states into Euro-Atlantic partnerships. As regards integration, much effort will be necessary in future to avoid the situation when individual states could lose contact with these trends due to their lack of progress. In the long-term this would have severe consequences for security of the entire continent.

 

Andrej Miholič

 

 

REFERENCES:

 

·        Arms Trade, Human Rights, and European Union Enlargement: The Record of Candidate Countries (2002) Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/eu_ briefing.htm (14. 09. 2004).

·        Bodansky, Yossef (2001) Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America. Roseville: Prima Publishing.

·        Bosnia's Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State Building (2003) International Crisis Group, http://www.icg.org//library/documents/report_archive/ A401057_22072003.pdf (10. 09. 2004).

·        Combs, Cindy C. (2003) Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education.

·        Combs, Cindy C. and Slann, Martin (2002) Encyclopedia of Terrorism. New York: Facts On File.

·        Gurr, Nadine and Cole, Benjamin (2000) The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction. London in New York: I. B. Tauris.

·        Kuzio, Taras (2002) Ukraine's Decade-Long Illegal Trade in Arms, http://www.utoronto. ca/crees/faculty/kuzio9.htm (06. 09. 2004).

·        Limanowska, Barbara (2002) Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe, United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), http://www.unhchr.ch/women/trafficking.pdf (02. 09. 2004).

·        Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria (2004) International Crisis Group, http:// www.icg.org//library/documents/europe/moldova/157_moldova_regional_tensions_over_ transdniestria.pdf (09. 09. 2004).

·        Moskos, Charles C. and Williams, John Allen and Segal, David R. (1999) Armed Forces After the Cold War. in The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War. Edited by Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, p. 1-13. New York: Oxford University Press.

·        Napoleoni, Loretta (2003) Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks. London and Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press.

·        Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability? (2004) International Crisis Group, http://www.icg.org//library/documents/europe/balkans/153_pan_albanianism_how _big.pdf (10. 09.2004).

·        Rogers, Paul (2000) Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-first Century. London and Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press.

·        Sagramoso, Domitilla (2001) The Proliferation of Illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons in and around the European Union: Instability, Organised Crime and Terrorist Groups, http://cms.isn.ch/public/docs/doc_10281_290_en.pdf (13. 06. 2004).

·        Southern Serbia’s Fragile Peace (2003) International Crisis Group, http://www.icg.org// library/documents/europe/balkans/152_south_serbia_fragile_peace.pdf (10. 09. 2004).

·        The World Factbook (2004) Central Intelligence Agency, http://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/factbook (09. 09. 2004).

·        Whittaker, David J. (2004) Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World. London and New York: Routledge.

·        World Drug Report 2004 (2004) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www. unodc.org/unodc/en/world_drug_report.html (13. 09. 2004).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX 1. Map of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX 2. Potential Conflict Areas in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe

 

 

 

APPENDIX 3. Significant Minorities in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe

 

 

 

APPENDIX 4. Opium Trafficking Routes in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX 5. Trends in Ammount of Damage (Human Losses) Caused by Terrorist Attacks in Periods 1945-2004 (mid-September) and 1991-2004 (mid-September)[7]:

 

Figure 1. Number of Terrorist Incidents That Caused More Than 100 Victims (Killed and Wounded Together) from 1945 to 2004 (mid-September)

 

 

 

Table 1. Number of Terrorist Incidents That Caused More Than 100 Victims (Killed and Wounded Together) from 1945 to 2004 (mid-September)

 

period

number of attacks

1945-1969

3

1970-1974

6

1975-1979

3

1980-1984

7

1985-1989

8

1990-1994

7

1995-1999

23

2000-2004

48

 

Figure 2. Total Number of Victims (Killed and Wounded) of Terrorist Incidents That Caused More Than 100 Victims from 1945 to 2004 (mid-September)

 

 

 

 

Table 2. Total Number of Victims (Killed and Wounded) of Terrorist Incidents That Caused More Than 100 Victims from 1945 to 2004 (mid-September)

 

period

number of victims

1945-1969

2525

1970-1974

1085

1975-1979

1430

1980-1984

2551

1985-1989

1662

1990-1994

3830

1995-1999

16333

2000-2004

23669

 

 

Figure 3. Number of Victims by Category (Killed or Wounded) of Terrorist Incidents That Caused More Than 100 Victims from 1945 to 2004 (mid-September)

 

 

 

 

Table 3. Number of Victims by Category (Killed or Wounded) of Terrorist Incidents That Caused More Than 100 Victims from 1945 to 2004 (mid-September)

 

 

period

number of killed

number of wounded

1945-1969

107

2418

1970-1974

86

999

1975-1979

830

600

1980-1984

568

1983

1985-1989

1080

582

1990-1994

440

3390

1995-1999

1262

15071

2000-2004

5432

18234

 

 

 

Figure 4. Number of Terrorist Incidents That Caused More Than 100 Victims (Killed and Wounded Together) from 1991 to 2004 (mid-September)

 

 

Table 4. Number of Terrorist Incidents That Caused More Than 100 Victims (Killed and Wounded Together) from 1991 to 2004 (mid-September)

 

 

period

number of attacks

1991

0

1992

2

1993

2

1994

3

1995

3

1996

5

1997

4

1998

6

1999

5

2000

3

2001

7

2002

9

2003

12

2004

17

 

Figure 5. Total Number of Victims (Killed and Wounded) of Terrorist Incidents That Caused More Than 100 Victims from 1991 to 2004 (mid-September)

 

 

 

Table 5. Total Number of Victims (Killed and Wounded) of Terrorist Incidents That Caused More Than 100 Victims from 1991 to 2004 (mid-September)

 

 

period

number of victims

1991

0

1992

411

1993

2663

1994

756

1995

6289

1996

2183

1997

627

1998

6315

1999

919

2000

359

2001

12586

2002

2145

2003

2682

2004

6094

 

Figure 6. Number of Victims by Category (Killed or Wounded) of Terrorist Incidents That Caused More Than 100 Victims from 1991 to 2004 (mid-September)

 

 

 

Table 6. Number of Victims by Category (Killed or Wounded) of Terrorist Incidents That Caused More Than 100 Victims from 1991 to 2004 (mid-September)

 

 

period

number of killed

number of wounded

1991

0

0

1992

41

370

1993

263

2400

1994

136

620

1995

186

6103

1996

137

2046

1997

58

569

1998

528

5787

1999

353

566

2000

36

323

2001

3110

9476

2002

559

1586

2003

408

2274

2004

1319

4775

 



[1] The process of diversification of security threats after the Cold War isn't limited to the european continent, it is in fact a global trend. The similar changes that went on in the United States threat environment in the same period were probably best described by words of former CIA Director, James Woolsey, who said (in February 1993) that the US had slain the dragon (of the old Soviet Union) but now faced a jungle full of poisonous snakes, meaning a variety of threats poised by states and sub-state actors (Rogers, 2000: 58).

[2] Cindy C. Combs and Martin Slann seem to agree with that. In their Encyclopedia of Terrorism they wrote that »there was a marked decline in state-sponsored terrorism in the last decade of the 20th century. A broad range of bilateral and multilateral sanctions enacted by states has served to discourage state sponsors of terrorism from continuing support for international acts of terrorism. The political and economic costs of being an open sponsor of terrorism baceme too high for most states to absorb« (Combs and Slann, 2002: 198).

 

[3] In 1996 he argued that »Where once terrorists undertook relatively small operations aimed at attaining specific political objectives, today they are more likely to inflict mass casualties as a form of revenge (Wilkinson in Gurr and Cole, 2000: 24).

 

[4] For example, in 1998 the Albanian security forces with the assistance of foreign intelligence services managed to prevent the attack by members of the Egyptian al-Jihad on the American embassy in Tirana.

[5] In early 1997 training camps and support installations were established in Albania by a group connected to Osama bin Laden. Those camps provided the Islamists with a regional safe haven, allowing the conduct of sustained operations and also supported the planned escalation of Islamist terrorism and subversion in Kosovo. Well over a hundred expert terrorists, mainly Arabs, were sent from Pakistan and Sudan to the Albanian camps. Terrorists already operating inside Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time were using a host of Islamic charitable and religious organizations as their cover (Bodansky, 2001: 200).

[6] During the second half of the 1990s, one of the KLA's primary sources of self-financing was the smuggling of narcotics originating from Afghanistan. The KLA also became a key player in the drugs-for-arms trade as well as in the laundering of drug money. German anti-narcotics agencies estimate that in 1998 $1,5 billion in drug profits was laundered in Kosovo, utilising about 200 private banks and currency exchange offices (Seper in Napoleoni, 2003: 94).

 

[7] Author's own calculations